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PRICING OF CYBER INSURANCE CONTRACTS
IN A NETWORK MODEL
MATTHIAS A. FAHRENWALDT, STEFAN WEBER, AND KERSTIN WESKE
Abstract. We develop a novel approach for pricing cyber insurance contracts. The considered
cyber threats, such as viruses and worms, diffuse in a structured data network. The spread of
the cyber infection is modeled by an interacting Markov chain. Conditional on the underlying
infection, the occurrence and size of claims are described by a marked point process. We
introduce and analyze a new polynomial approximation of claims together with a mean-field
approach that allows to compute aggregate expected losses and prices of cyber insurance.
Numerical case studies demonstrate the impact of the network topology and indicate that
higher order approximations are indispensable for the analysis of non-linear claims.
1. Introduction
Cyber risk has evolved as a major threat to businesses. For instance, Lloyd’s of London
estimates that the total extent of cyber attacks to businesses worldwide comprises losses of
USD 400 billion a year (Gandel (2015)). In addition, the size of exposure to cyber risks might
significantly grow in our interconnected world. Although companies seem aware of these threats,
recent studies find that relatively few firms have yet built a formal cyber risk management
system (Swiss Re/IBM (2016)). Their management of cyber risks consists mostly of ad-hoc self-
protection mechanisms such as firewalls and anti-virus software, but very few perform regular
cyber risk assessments and possess risk management programs that integrate cyber risk on an
institutional level.
Cyber damage may occur accidentally, but might also be purposely caused. As described in
Swiss Re/IBM (2016), costs “are no longer confined to coping with lost, stolen or corrupted
data, but increasingly include potential damage to a firm’s property and reputation, and also
the cost associated with business interruption or severe disruption to critical infrastructure”.
Even if future risk management strategies were able to actively improve protection against
the occurrence or impact of cyber events, some residual cyber risks would remain that require
insurance solutions.
From an actuarial point of view, cyber risk is challenging in three ways. First, data is not
available in the required amount or in the desired granularity to apply standard statistical meth-
ods. Second, technology and cyber threats are evolving fast; the cyber environment is highly
non-stationary. Third, infectious cyber threats pose a large accumulation risk to an insurance
company. The typical insurance independence assumption does not hold and, moreover, there
is no geographical distinction between dependent groups as there is, for example, for natural
catastrophes. This requires new mathematical models that capture the dependence structure
of cyber networks in an appropriate way (see also Swiss Re Institute (2017)).
This is the aim of the present paper. Causes and channels for cyber losses are diverse.
While an insider attack might cause substantial damage to a particular firm, it might not affect
other firms. However, if the originally attacked firm is part of a larger network in which the
operations of components depend on each other, consecutive and coupled losses might occur.
Another related example are worms, viruses and Trojans that spread across data networks and
facilitate attacks throughout the network. Our paper focuses on cyber threats in networks, i.e.,
infectious cyber threats.
From an insurance perspective, our main contributions are the following:
Date: March 16, 2018.
Key words and phrases. Cyber insurance, emerging risks, polynomial approximation, mean-field approximation.
1
2 M.A. FAHRENWALDT, S. WEBER, AND K. WESKE
(i) To the best of our knowledge, we develop the first mathematical model of insured losses
generated by infectious cyber threats. Dependence is modeled as an undirected network
where each node could represent a firm, a system of computers or a single device; each
edge constitutes a possible transmission channel in a network.
(ii) We provide a new methodology to calculate expected aggregate losses of a (re-)insurance
company. Our method is applicable to a large variety of contract designs including both
linear and non-linear functions of the generated losses. The application is illustrated in
numerical examples. Thus, our approach can be used for pricing decisions.
(iii) In numerical case studies, we analyze the role of the network topology. We find that the
insured network structure has a significant impact on the generated losses. This illustrates
that the topology of the network is a key ingredient for the pricing of cyber insurance
contracts and for cyber risk management in general.
Our model consists of two parts: a stochastic process that captures cyber infections, and
a mechanism that randomly generates the actual claims at the infected nodes. To model the
claims, we introduce a marked point process. This is in spirit of the collective risk model of
insurance (see, e.g., Burnecki, Janczura & Weron (2011)). In contrast to the standard setting,
the claims in our model depend on the spread of the cyber threat. The cyber infections are
modeled by a susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) network process (see, e.g., Section V. in
Pastor-Satorras, Castellano, Van Mieghem & Vespignani (2015)). For a network of size N , this
approach results in a continuous-time Markov chain with a very large state space of size 2N .
In order to cope with the resulting computational challenges, we develop a tractable mean-
field approximation for the Markov process. Approximations of its moments are derived as
solutions to systems of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) (see, e.g., Van Mieghem, Omic
& Kooij (2009) and Van Mieghem (2011)). Combining these solutions with our claim model
finally yields approximations of the expected insured losses. For this purpose, we develop a
polynomial approximation approach to evaluate general, possibly non-linear, claim functions.
In the context of SIS-processes we provide the following contributions to the theory of mean-field
approximations:
(i) We suggest a general and rigorous framework for mean-field approximations of the mo-
ments of the spread process of arbitrary order n ≥ 1. We show that there are two key
ingredients defining the approximation: a mean-field function, and a splitting algorithm.
(ii) We analyze two mean-field functions in detail that lead to different schemes: the well-
known independent approximation (also called NIMFA approximation, see Van Mieghem
et al. (2009)) and a new approximation type: the Hilbert approximation.
(iii) For the first order independent approximation, we derive a time-dependent accuracy result.
(iv) For both approximation types, NIMFA and Hilbert, we provide splitting algorithms and
briefly address the question of optimal splitting.
Literature. The paper connects three different research areas: mathematical modeling of cyber
insurance, epidemics on networks, and marked point processes.
Cyber insurance. The literature on mathematical cyber insurance modeling focuses mainly on
simple game-theoretic models. These consider, e.g., the following questions: Does a cyber in-
surance market exist in equilibrium (Bo¨hme (2005))? Does cyber insurance affect the incentives
to self-protection (Bolot & Lelarge (2008)), and how does it influence social welfare (Schwartz
& Sastry (2014))? A recent review of such game-theoretic approaches can be found in the sur-
vey article Marotta, Martinelli, Nanni & Yautsiukhin (2015). In contrast to these papers, we
model cyber insurance with the aim of simulating and evaluating losses and pricing insurance
contracts. To date, cyber loss models are mostly based on deterministic scenarios (see Swiss Re
Institute (2017)). In contrast, we derive a stochastic model and develop suitable approximation
techniques to explicitly calculate the losses.
Epidemic models. We use the network-based susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model, also
known as the contact process, to model the spread of the considered cyber threat. This con-
tinuous time Markov chain has been extensively analyzed. A key topic in the analysis is the
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long-term behavior of the system as a function of the model parameter τ—the ratio of the
infection to the curing rate. For networks of infinite size, both survival and extinction of the
considered threat can occur. For example, in the network Zk there exists a critical value τc such
that for τ ≤ τc, the infection dies out, while for τ > τc, the infection survives (cf. Liggett (1985)
for the case k = 1, and Bezuidenhout & Grimmett (1990) and Liggett (1999), Part I, Section 2,
for k ≥ 1). For networks of finite size, however, the infection will almost surely die out in finite
time. This is due to the presence of the absorbing healthy state in the Markov chain. Still,
there is a different kind of threshold behavior of the system: There exists a critical value for τ
that determines the behavior of the expected extinction time as a function of the network size
N . Below this critical value, the expected extinction time increases logarithmically for increas-
ing N ; above, it increases exponentially fast (see, e.g., Durrett & Liu (1988) for an analysis of
the chain graph {1, . . . , N} and Mountford, Mourrat, Valesin & Yao (2016) for bounds on the
expected survival time for the homogeneous tree of bounded degree). For a recent survey paper,
including bounds in general graphs, we refer to Nowzari, Preciado & Pappas (2016) (Theorems
4 and 5).
In our insurance application, we are mainly interested in the moments of the Markovian
spread process. These can be used to approximate expected losses and to compute insurance
premiums. Since the exact calculation of these moments requires the solution of a system
of 2N − 1 ordinary differential equations, we use a lower order mean-field approximation in
the sense of Van Mieghem et al. (2009). In contrast to the degree-based mean-field approach
(Pastor-Satorras & Vespignani (2001), Bogun˜a´ & Pastor-Satorras (2002)) which builds on av-
erage degrees, this individual-based approach captures the complete structure of the network.
This enables us to analyze the influence of the network topology on the spread of the infection
and on insured losses.
Van Mieghem et al. (2009) derive a first order independent mean-field approximation called
NIMFA. We add an analysis of its accuracy. In contrast to earlier papers (such as Van Mieghem
& van de Bovenkamp (2015)), we provide a time-dependent accuracy criterion that is able to
qualitatively capture the behavior of the approximation error over time, if the parameter τ is
sufficiently small. For larger values of τ , however, we observe that first order approximations
may lead to substantial errors. In this case, we propose not to use a first, but a higher order
approximation.
The fact that the mean-field approximation approach can be generalized to higher orders has
already been noted previously; we refer to Cator & Van Mieghem (2012) for a second order
independent approximation with single split, to Mata & Ferreira (2013) for a second order
pair-approximation, and to Pastor-Satorras et al. (2015, p.19) for a recent review. The present
paper provides the first explicit derivation of a general n-th order mean-field approximation,
i.e., an approximation of the moments of the spread process up to order n. We show that our
n-th order mean-field approximation is defined by two main ingredients: a mean-field function,
and a splitting algorithm. Our framework comprises the previous contributions Van Mieghem
et al. (2009) and Cator & Van Mieghem (2012) as special cases. It is also more general than
these papers and enables us to introduce and analyze a new Hilbert approximation and splitting
algorithms.
Marked Point Processes. To model the claims, we use a marked point process. A general
introduction to this type of processes as well as the main theoretical results can be found in
Jacod (1975), Bre´maud (1981) and Last & Brandt (1995). Marked point processes have been
applied in many different areas such as credit risk modeling, see, e.g., Bielecki & Rutkowski
(2004), survival analysis, see, e.g., Jacobsen (2006, Chapter 8) and insurance loss modeling,
see, e.g., Burnecki et al. (2011). In this paper, we build on the latter approach; however, our
loss process is additionally coupled with the underlying spread process of the cyber infection.
This captures the idea that only infected nodes may suffer losses. A similar approach is used in
Giesecke & Weber (2004) and Giesecke & Weber (2006) in the context of liquidity and credit
risk.
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Outline. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our exact loss model. Section
2.1 introduces the SIS Markov chain as a model of the infection process. Section 2.2 describes
the marked point process that generates the claims at infected sites. A formula for the expected
aggregate losses of a reinsurer is derived. Section 3 explains different approximations. Section
3.1 presents a polynomial approximation approach to evaluate non-linear claim functions. Sec-
tion 3.2 introduces mean-field approximations of the moments of the spread process. We first
analyze first order approximations and the corresponding ODE systems. Second, we define the
general n-th order approximation and its two key ingredients: the mean-field function, and the
splitting algorithm. Section 4 illustrates in numerical case studies how the suggested approach
may be applied to the pricing of different insurance contracts. This allows to study the influ-
ence of the underlying network topology. Section 5 concludes. All proofs can be found in an
appendix.
2. Exact Loss Model
We consider a cyber threat that spreads via two consecutive channels. First, a vulnerability
is created by an infection in a given network of agents. More specifically, each agent (a cor-
poration, a system of computers, or a single device) is represented by a node in the network;
each edge constitutes a possible transmission channel of the cyber infection. An edge could be
a direct link between individual agents, or a link to a central server that stores data or supplies
users with software updates. Second, infected agents are vulnerable to randomly occurring
attacks, triggering losses of random size. For example, an infected computer may be attacked
by collecting and abusing private information such as credit card or banking information, or
by disturbing operations on the computer via ransomware. If agents are insured against cy-
ber damage, insurance claims depend on two different types of stochastic processes: first, the
infectious spread process of the vulnerability, and, second, the claim frequency and severity
processes.
2.1. Spread Process. The cyber network consists of N agents, labeled 1, . . . , N . To begin
with, we focus in the current paper on a simple undirected graph. The suggested model could
easily be extended to directed and weighted graph structures. Such extensions could pro-
vide more realistic models of cyber networks with asymmetric infection channels of different
strengths, but their analysis would be more involved, and we thus leave a detailed analysis of
complex networks to future research. The undirected network is represented by a symmetric
adjacency matrix A ∈ {0, 1}N×N , with aii = 0 for all i, where aij = 1 indicates a connection
between nodes i and j and aij = 0 signifies that i and j are not directly connected.
To describe the dynamics of the first channel, the infectious spread of vulnerability to cyber
events, we use the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model, as, for example, explained in
Section V. of Pastor-Satorras et al. (2015)). At any point in time, each node i can be in one
of two states: infected or susceptible. The state of node i at time t is denoted by Xi(t), where
Xi(t) = 1 indicates that node i is infected at time t and Xi(t) = 0 indicates that node i is
susceptible to an infection. We assume that each node can be infected by its infected neighbors,
but is cured independently of all other nodes in the system. We assume that each node is
endowed with an independent exponential clock and changes its state when the exponential
clock rings. Letting β > 0 and δ > 0, the rates of these transitions are given as follows
(i = 1, 2, . . . , N):
Xi : 0→ 1 with rate β
∑N
j=1
aijXj(t) (1)
Xi : 1→ 0 with rate δ.
To be precise, we will from now on work on a probability space (Ω,F , P ) with filtration
F = (Ft)t≥0 that satisfies the usual conditions, i.e., the filtration is right-continuous and F0
contains all P -null sets, see, e.g., Protter (2004). The process X is a Markov-process with state
space E = {0, 1}N with ca`dla`g paths and X0 = x ∈ E. We assume that X is a Feller process
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with generator G : C(E)→ R defined by
Gf(x) =
N∑
i=1
β(1− xi) N∑
j=1
aijxj + xiδ
 (f(xi)− f(x)), x ∈ E, f ∈ C(E)
where xij = xj for i 6= j and xii = 1 − xi. The family C(E) consists of all functions on E. For
details we refer to Liggett (1985).
The continuous-time Markov process X is of pure jump-type with exponential waiting times
between jumps. The dimension of the state space E is large, i.e., E has cardinality 2N . In
Section 3.2, we derive a tractable mean-field approximation in terms of a system of ordinary
differential equations that can be applied to the valuation of cyber insurance.
2.2. Claims Processes. In our model of cyber losses and insurance, we assume that the process
X does not directly cause any damage. Instead, at each point in time, infected agents are
vulnerable to cyber attacks, while agents who are not infected are not. For example, infected
agents might constitute a botnet that enables a denial-of-service or ransomware attack.
In order to model cyber losses, we assume that the attacks are counted by a process M :=
(M(t))t≥0. The corresponding jump times are denoted by (Tn)n∈N. The size of possible losses
at each site during an attack is modeled by another process L := (L(t))t≥0, where L(t) =
(L1(t), . . . , LN (t))
>. We assume that both M and L are independent from the Markovian
spread process X.
To be precise, M is a non-explosive counting process adapted to the filtration F. We suppose
that M has a stochastic intensity (λ(t))t≥0, i.e., λ is some nonnegative F-predictable process
with M(t ∧ Tn)−
∫ t∧Tn
0 λ(s)ds is a martingale for all n ∈ N, see Bre´maud (1981), T9/p. 28 &
T13/p. 31. The loss process L is assumed to be predictable and nonnegative.
We consider a (re-)insurance contract covering cyber losses and compute the expected ag-
gregate losses over a fixed time window [0, T ] with T > 0. We suppose that for any time t
the insurance contract is characterized by a function f(·; ·) : R+ × RN+ → R+ where the first
argument refers to time and the second argument to the loss vector generated by a cyber attack.
We suppose that f is jointly measurable.
We denote the Hadamard product of vectors (i.e., the multiplication of the components) by
◦. At time t, the insurance contract covers f(t;L(t) ◦ X(t)), if a loss event occurs at time t.
Neglecting interest rates or considering discounted quantities, the expected aggregate losses of
the contract over the time window [0, T ] are thus given by:
E
[∫ T
0
f(t;L(t) ◦X(t))dM(t)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
f(t;L(t) ◦X(t−))dM(t)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
f(t;L(t) ◦X(t−))λ(t)dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
f(t;L(t) ◦X(t))λ(t)dt
]
. (2)
The first equality is due to the fact that X and M are independent and never jump at the same
time with probability 1. The second equality follows from the predictability of the integrand
according to D7/p. 27 in Bre´maud (1981). The third equality holds, since the paths of X
possess at most countably many jumps on [0, T ] and constitute a Lebesgue null set for each
path.
The simplest contract f is a proportional insurance, i.e., f(t; z) =
∑N
i=1 αizi. In this case,
E
[∫ T
0
f(t;L(t) ◦X(t))dM(t)
]
=
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
αi · E[Xi(t)] · E[Li(t)λ(t)] dt, (3)
where the factorization follows from the independence of X and (M,λ,L).
For a linear claim function, the computation of the expected losses of the insurance contract
does not require full knowledge of the dynamics of the spread process X, but only of its expec-
tation, i.e., the first moment. If f is non-linear, but continuous, a polynomial approximation
can be used in order to evaluate equation (2). This requires knowledge of the evolution of all
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moments of X up to the degree that is desired for the evaluation. This will be explained in
Section 3.1.
Due to Kolmogorov’s equations, using the fact that the components of X are idempotent and
commutative, the moments of X are described by a finite system of ordinary differential equa-
tions of order N consisting of
∑N
i=1
(
N
i
)
= 2N − 1 equations. For large N , this coupled system
of equations of first order becomes intractable1. If the order of the polynomial approximation
is less N , say n, only moments of X up to order n are needed. However, the ordinary differen-
tial equations for these moments depend on higher order moments, i.e., the desired system of
equations is not closed. We address this problem in Section 3.2 by constructing a mean-field ap-
proximation of the dynamics of the desired moments which significantly reduces the dimension
of the system of ordinary differential equations.
3. Approximations
3.1. Polynomial Approximation of Non-Linear Claim Functions. In this section, we
discuss a polynomial approximation of the claim function f that facilitates the computation
of expected insurance losses (2) in the non-linear case. In order to simplify the mathematical
analysis, we assume in this paper that f does not depend on t. We do, however, stress that our
analysis can be extended to the time-dependent case at the expense of constructing approxi-
mations that are sufficiently regular in time. This requires a more complicated notation. The
basic idea of the polynomial approximation is that any continuous function f can be uniformly
approximated by polynomials on any compact set according to the Stone-Weierstraß theorem.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 3.1.
(i) The function f : RN+ → R+ is decomposable, i.e., one can write
f(x1, . . . , xN ) = g(Λ(x1, . . . , xN )),
where Λ : RN+ → R+ is a linear and increasing aggregation function and g : R+ → R is
continuous and increasing.
(ii) The function g is bounded on [0, ‖Λ(L)‖∞) where ‖ · ‖∞ denotes the L∞-norm.
Example 3.2.
(i) A first example is a catastrophe excess of loss per risk (Cat XL) contract that covers
cyber attacks with priority a > 0 and limit b− a > 0. In this case, insurance losses are
described by
fCat-XL(x1, . . . , xN ) = g
Cat-XL(ΛΣ(x1, . . . , xN ))
with ΛΣ(x1, . . . , xN ) =
∑N
i=1 xi, and g
Cat-XL(y) = (y− a)+− (y− b)+. This shows that
fCat-XL satisfies Assumption 3.1.
(ii) Another example is an excess of loss per risk contract (XL) that covers all individual
cyber losses. This is described by
fXL(x1, . . . , xN ) :=
N∑
i=1
(
(xi − ai)+ − (xi − bi)+
)
,
where ai > 0 is the priority of risk i and bi − ai > 0 is corresponding cover. This
function is neither linear nor does it satisfy Assumption 3.1. However, with a small
trick it fits into both frameworks. To this end, observe that
fXL(L(t) ◦X(t)) =
N∑
i=1
(
(Li(t)Xi(t)− ai)+ − (Li(t)Xi(t)− bi)+
)
.
1On the computing system we used for our simulations, N = 13 is the maximum network size for which the
system can be solved exactly.
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Since Xi(t) ∈ {0, 1}, this function can be rewritten in the following form:
fXL(L(t) ◦X(t)) =
N∑
i=1
Lˆi(t)Xi(t) =: fˆ
XL(Lˆ(t) ◦X(t)),
where Lˆi(t) = (Li(t)− ai)+ − (Li(t)− bi)+ for i = 1, . . . , N . Then
fˆXL(x1, . . . , xN ) =
N∑
i=1
xi.
For the modified loss size process Lˆ, the function fˆXL describes a proportional reinsur-
ance. If L has bounded support, also Assumption 3.1 is satisfied with Λ = fˆXL and
g(λ) = λ for λ ≥ 0.
Remark 3.3. The application of the Stone-Weierstraß theorem does not rely on the existence
of a decomposition of f as required in Assumption 3.1. The decomposition guarantees that we
may work with polynomial approximations in one dimension. In this case, simple algorithms
for the construction of the unique best approximation are available. In contrast, due to the
theorem of Mairhuber-Curtis, finite-dimensional subspaces of the space of continuous functions
on a multi-dimensional compact set are not Haar spaces, implying that best approximations are
not always unique.
If Assumption 3.1 is satisfied, a polynomial approximation can be constructed as follows:
Approximation 3.4.
(i) Choose a bound  > 0 and the desired degree of the polynomial approximation d ∈ N.
(ii) Determine a constant u ∈ R+ such that the probability that an aggregated loss (under
a total infection) exceeds u is bounded from above by , i.e.,
P (Λ(L) > u) ≤ .
(iii) Find the best uniform approximation pd(x) :=
∑d
`=0 a`x
` (a0, a1, . . . , ad ∈ R) of the
function g on the compact interval [0, u] in the space of polynomials up to degree d.
We denote the resulting approximation error by
max
x∈[0,u]
|g(x)− pd(x)| = ‖g − pd‖∞,[0,u] =: ed(g).
(iv) The d-th degree polynomial approximation of f(L ◦X) is given by
f¯d(L ◦X) :=
{
pd(Λ(L ◦X)), if Λ(L) ≤ u,
0, if Λ(L) > u.
Remark 3.5. Due to Assumption 3.1, there exists a real number m s.t.
|f(L ◦X)| = |g(Λ(L ◦X))| ≤ |g(Λ(L))| ≤ m
for all possible realizations of the random variable L. The L1-norm of the approximation error
for f¯d(L ◦ X) is bounded from above by ed(g) + m · . This can easily be verified. Letting
Z = L ◦X, we obtain that
‖f(Z)− f¯d(Z)‖L1 = ‖[f(Z)− pd(Λ(Z))] · 1[0,u](Λ(L)) + f(Z) · 1(u,∞)(Λ(L))‖L1
≤ E[|g(Λ(Z))− pd(Λ(Z))| · 1[0,u](Λ(L))] + E[|f(Z)| · 1(u,∞)(Λ(L))]
(◦)
≤ ‖g − pd‖∞,[0,u] · P (Λ(L) ≤ u) +m · P (Λ(L) > u)
≤ ed(g) +m · ,
observing in step (◦) that 0 ≤ Λ(Z) ≤ Λ(L).
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Finally, consider an insurance contract f = g(Λ) with Λ(x1, . . . , xN ) =
∑N
i=1 bixi, b1, b2, . . . , bN ≥
0, and polynomial approximation pd(x) :=
∑d
`=0 a`x
`. In this case,
E
[∫ T
0
f¯d(L(t) ◦X(t))dM(t)
]
=
∫ T
0
E[f¯d(L(t) ◦X(t)) · λ(t)] dt.
Set G := σ{L(t), λ(t) : t ≤ T}, and observe that the process X is independent of G. Thus,
E[f¯d(L(t) ◦X(t)) · λ(t)|G] = λ(t) · E[f¯d(L(t) ◦X(t))|G]. (4)
We evaluate the second factor. For simplicity, we suppress the dependence on t in the notation.
E[ f¯d(L ◦X) | G] = E[ pd(Λ(L ◦X)) · 1[0,u](Λ(L)) | G]
=
d∑
`=0
a` · E[(Λ(L ◦X))` | G] · 1[0,u](Λ(L)) =
d∑
`=0
a` · E[(
∑N
i=1
biLiXi)
` | G] · 1[0,u](Λ(L))
= 1[0,u](Λ(L)) ·
[
a0 + a1
N∑
i1=1
bi1Li1E[Xi1 ] + a2
N∑
i1=1
N∑
i2=1
bi1bi2Li1Li2E[Xi1Xi2 ]
+ . . .+ ad
N∑
i1=1
N∑
i2=1
· · ·
N∑
id=1
bi1bi2 · · · bid · Li1Li2 · · ·Lid · E[Xi1Xi2 · · ·Xid ]
 .
Here, we used the fact that the process L is G-measurable, while X is independent of G. In
the last step, we can now use the tower property on the conditional expectations in equation
(4), i.e., E[E(·|G)] = E(·), to obtain the final result. Thus, in summary, for the purpose of
approximating the expected insurance losses we need to calculate∫ T
0
E
(
1[0,u](Λ(L)) · λ(t) ·
N∑
i=1
[
a0 + a1
N∑
i1=1
bi1Li1E[Xi1 ] + a2
N∑
i1=1
N∑
i2=1
bi1bi2Li1Li2E[Xi1Xi2 ]
+ . . .+ ad
N∑
i1=1
N∑
i2=1
· · ·
N∑
id=1
bi1bi2 · · · bid · Li1Li2 · · ·Lid · E[Xi1Xi2 · · ·Xid ]
 dt (5)
The formula shows that full knowledge of the probabilistic evolution of the process X is not
required. Instead, an analysis of the dynamics of its moments up to order d suffices to compute
the sought quantity. As explained earlier, the corresponding system of ordinary differential
equations is obtained from Kolmogorov’s equations, but involves 2N − 1 equations. A closed
system for the required moments with a smaller number of equations can be obtained by a
mean-field approximation. This method will be explained in the next section.
3.2. Mean-Field-Approximation of Moments. In order to evaluate formula (5), we need
to compute the moments E[Xi1(t)], E[Xi1(t)Xi2(t)], . . . , E[Xi1(t)Xi2(t) · · ·Xin(t)], i1, . . . , in ∈
{1, . . . , N}, for the desired n ≤ N . We construct an approximation of these moments and call
the parameter n its order. For this purpose, we denote by z
(n)
i1i2...ik
the n-th order approximation
of the moment E[Xi1Xi2 · · ·Xik ] for k ≤ n. Observe that both z(n)i1i2...ik and E[Xi1Xi2 · · ·Xik ]
are functions of t. In order to simplify the notation, we will sometimes drop the variable t in
our notation. Since the variables Xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, are commutative and idempotent, we may
assume that the indices i1, . . . , ik are pairwise different and ordered, i.e., i1 < i2 < . . . < ik.
Alternatively, the n-th order approximation of all moments of X up to order n can simply be
enumerated by index sets I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N} with cardinality |I| ≤ n. This will be the convention
that we choose. As a final result of our construction, we obtain the n-th order approximation
of all moments of X up to order n, i.e.,(
z
(n)
I
)
I⊆{1,2,...,N}, |I|≤n
We begin with a detailed description of the first order approximation, explaining two strategies
for its construction. This approach is later generalized to n-th order approximations for n > 1.
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3.2.1. First Order. We derive the first order mean-field approximation in detail and analyze
its accuracy.
3.2.1.1. Derivation of the Approximations. The transition rates (1) describe the infinitesimal
dynamics of Xi(t):
E [Xi(t+ ∆t)−Xi(t)|Ft] = ((1−Xi(t))β
N∑
j=1
aijXj(t)− δXi(t))∆t+ o(∆t) (6)
A susceptible node is infected by its neighbors at rate β; an infected node is cured at rate δ,
independently of the state of the others. Intuitively, dividing by ∆t, taking the expectation on
both sides and letting ∆t → 0, we obtain the following exact expression for the derivative of
the probability E[Xi(t)] = P (Xi(t) = 1):
dE[Xi(t)]
dt
= −δE[Xi(t)] + β
N∑
j=1
aijE[Xj(t)]− β
N∑
j=1
aijE[Xi(t)Xj(t)], (7)
for i = 1, . . . , N . More precisely, these equations are a consequence of Kolmogorov’s forward
equation.
The occurrence of the mixed terms E[Xi(t)Xj(t)] for i 6= j signifies that the dynamics of
the first order moments depend on higher order moments. The system of ordinary differential
equations (7) is not closed. An exact solution requires in addition the dynamics of the second
order moments, third order moments, etc. Instead of increasing the number of equations, the
aim of the first order mean-field approximation is to keep the number of equations fixed, but
to pay the price of obtaining an approximate in lieu of an exact solution.
We choose a suitable function F : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] and split the mixed terms as
E[Xi(t)Xj(t)] ≈ F (E[Xi(t)]) · F (E[Xj(t)]).
This leads to the following approximation:
dE[Xi(t)]
dt
≈ −δE[Xi(t)] + β
N∑
j=1
aijE[Xj(t)]− β
N∑
j=1
aijF (E[Xi(t)]) · F (E[Xj(t)]). (8)
We denote by z
(1)
i (t) the corresponding approximation of E[Xi(t)] and arrive at the following
system of ODEs
dz
(1)
i (t)
dt
= −δz(1)i (t) + β
N∑
j=1
aijz
(1)
i (t)− β
N∑
j=1
aijF (z
(1)
i (t)) · F (z(1)j (t)) (i = 1, . . . , N). (9)
This is the first order mean-field approximation corresponding to the mean-field function F .
Next, we consider two examples of mean-field functions and the resulting first order approx-
imations z
(1)
i (t) in more detail.
(i) If we choose a mean-field function F1(x) = x, we obtain the first order independent ap-
proximation, also known as the “N -intertwined mean-field approximation (NIMFA)”.
This approximation is discussed in detail by Van Mieghem et al. (2009). The approxi-
mation factorizes the second order moments as if components were independent:
E[Xi(t)Xj(t)] ≈ F1(E[Xi(t)]) · F1(E[Xj(t)]) = E[Xi(t)]E[Xj(t)].
Since E[Xi(t)Xj(t)] = E[Xi(t)]E[Xj(t)]+Cov(Xi(t), Xj(t)) with Cov(Xi(t), Xj(t)) ≥ 0,
as shown in Cator & Van Mieghem (2014), equation (8) leads to an upper bound:
dE[Xi(t)]
dt
≤ −δE[Xi(t)] + β
N∑
j=1
aijE[Xj(t)]− β
N∑
j=1
aijE[Xi(t)]E[Xj(t)].
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The upper bound mean-field approximation vi(t) := z
(1)
i (t) is characterized by the
ordinary differential equations
dvi(t)
dt
= −δvi(t) + β
N∑
j=1
aijvj(t)− β
N∑
j=1
aijvi(t)vj(t), (i = 1, . . . , N). (10)
Setting V := (v1, v2, . . . , vN )
>, we may rewrite the system in matrix notation:
d
dt
V = (βA− δI)V − β diag(V )AV, (11)
where diag(V ) denotes the diagonal matrix with entries v1, v2, . . . , vN and I ∈ RN×N
denotes the identity matrix.
(ii) A mean-field function F2(x) :=
√
x leads to a new type of mean-field approximation.
We call this the first order Hilbert approximation that is motivated by the following
observations. The space of square-integrable random variables L2, equipped with the
scalar product 〈R,S〉 := E[R · S] for R,S ∈ L2, forms a Hilbert space. The induced
norm is denoted by ‖R‖ := √〈R,R〉 = √E[R2]. The scalar product in Hilbert spaces
defines the angle φ between vectors:
〈R,S〉 = ‖R‖ · ‖S‖ · cosφ.
The idea is now to use ‖R‖ · ‖S‖ as an approximation for 〈R,S〉. The term ‖R‖ · ‖S‖ is
never smaller than 〈R,S〉. The approximation is good, if the angle of R and S is close
to 0◦. Applying the approximation to equations (7), we obtain
dE[Xi(t)]
dt
≥ −δE[Xi(t)]+β
N∑
k=1
aikE[Xk(t)]−β
N∑
k=1
aik
√
E[Xi(t)]
√
E[Xk(t)], i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
(12)
Setting wi(t) := z
(1)
i (t), this leads to the following mean-field approximation:
dwi(t)
dt
= −δwi(t) + β
N∑
k=1
aikwk(t)− β
N∑
k=1
aik
√
wi(t)
√
wk(t), (i = 1, . . . , N).
Setting W = (w1, . . . , wN )
> and
√
W = (
√
w1, . . . ,
√
wN )
>, we may rewrite the system
in matrix notation:
dW
dt
= (βA− δI)W − βdiag(
√
W )A
√
W. (13)
3.2.1.2. Properties of ODE Systems. The following theorem summarizes key properties of the
mean-field approximations. Its proof can be found in Appendix A. Let 0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0)> ∈ RN
and 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1)> ∈ RN denote the all-zero and the all-one vector, respectively.
Theorem 3.6.
(i) Existence. For any choice of the parameters δ and β, there exist global solutions of the
ODE systems (11) and (13) with arbitrary non-negative initial conditions.
(ii) Uniqueness. The ODE system (11) possesses a unique solution in C([0,∞);RN ).
(iii) Sandwich Property. Let W (t) be a solution of (13) and V (t) the solution to (11). For
every initial condition V (0) = W (0) = X(0) = v0 ∈ [0, 1]N , it holds that
0 ≤W (t) ≤ E[X(t)] ≤ V (t) ≤ 1,
for all t ≥ 0, where the inequalities are interpreted componentwise.
(iv) Stability. Let µˆ be the spectral radius of A and set τ
(1)
c := 1/µˆ, a constant that depends
on the underlying network. Define τ = β/δ. If τ < τ
(1)
c , then the zero solutions
V ≡ 0 and W ≡ 0 are exponentially stable solutions of (11) and (13), i.e., there exist
constants α, , C > 0 such that for any solution z of (11) and (13), respectively, and
all t ≥ 0
|z(t)| ≤ Ce−αt|z(0)|,
CYBER INSURANCE 11
if |z(0)| ≤ .
We illustrate the two suggested approximation methodologies in the context of a small cyber
network.
Example 3.7. We consider a system of N = 7 agents that are connected in a cyber network
as described in Figure 1.
A :=

0 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 1 0

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Figure 1. A regular network with N = 7 nodes and degree D = 4.
The network is regular, i.e., each node is connected to exactly D other nodes. We choose
D = 4, β = 0.5 and δ = 2.01. Then τ = β/δ = 0.2488 < 1/D = τ
(1)
c , thus V ≡ 0 and W ≡ 0
are exponentially stable according to Theorem 3.6 (iv). We assume that initially only node
1 is infected, i.e., V (0) = W (0) = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)>. Figure 2 shows the aggregate infection
probabilities for all nodes (A), i.e.,
∑N
j=1 E[Xj(t)], and respectively for all initially healthy
nodes (B), here:
∑N
j=2 E[Xj(t)], for the original Markov process together with the corresponding
approximations. As explained in Theorem 3.6 (iii), these provide lower and upper bounds. For
both approximations, the error is quite substantial. As we will see in the following sections,
this can be improved by higher order approximations.
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Figure 2. Comparison of the aggregate infection probability of all nodes (A)
and of initially healthy nodes (B) for the network described in Figure 1.
3.2.1.3. Accuracy Criterion. We derive a time-dependent estimate of the accuracy of the first
order independent mean-field approximation. We focus on the correlation matrix as a rough
measure for the difference between the exact and approximate dynamics of the E[Xi(t)].
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The first step is to rewrite (7) as
d
dt
E[Xi(t)] = −δE[Xi(t)] + β(1− E[Xi(t)])
N∑
k=1
akiE[Xk(t)]− βRi(t)
with error term
Ri(t) :=
N∑
k=1
akiCov(Xi(t), Xk(t)).
In Van Mieghem & van de Bovenkamp (2015), the authors consider Ri as a measure for the
accuracy of the approximation. They investigate numerical examples and analytical criteria
to assess the smallness of Ri in different situations. It is clear that in the independent case,
yielding Ri(t) ≡ 0 for all i, the exact dynamics and the approximation are identical. This is the
reason for our choice of the term independent approximation. Our result phrases the accuracy
of the approximation as a pointwise inequality in the time variable t.
Theorem 3.8. Let yi(t) := E[Xi(t)] − vi(t) and denote by µˆ the largest eigenvalue of the
adjacency matrix A. Then for any t ≥ 0 we have
||y(t)||2 ≤ e(−2δ+4βµˆ+β)tβ
∫ t
0
||R(s)||2ds,
where y(t) = (y1(t), . . . , yN (t)) and R(t) = (R1(t), . . . , RN (t)).
The proof of Theorem 3.8 is given in Appendix A. To apply this result, we approximate the
norm of the residual term R(t) by
‖R(t)‖2 =
N∑
i=1
(
N∑
k=1
akiCov(Xi(t), Xk(t))
)2
≤ 1
16
N∑
i=1
(
N∑
k=1
aki
)2
≤ N
16
N∑
i=1
N∑
k=1
aik =
N`
8
,
using Cauchy’s inequality and denoting by ` the total number of links within the network.
Hence, we find the following upper bound for the mean-field approximation error, expressed
solely through known characteristics of the given network:
‖y(t)‖2 ≤ βN`
8
· te(−2δ+4βµˆ+β)t. (14)
In the case that −2δ + 4βµˆ+ β < 0, i.e., for small τ = β/δ < 12µˆ+1/2 , the approximation error
becomes small quite quickly. This corresponds to a high curing rate δ in comparison to the
infection rate β. Observe that the stated exponential decay is a useful result for t sufficiently
large. Since N` can be very large, equation (14) does not provide substantial information
regarding the approximation error for small t.
Example 3.9. We consider the network in Figure 1 with fixed infection rate β = 0.5, but
different curing rate δ. The initial state is V (0) = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)>, i.e., only node 1 is infected
at time zero. Figure 3 (A) depicts the exact approximation error ‖y(t)‖2. The upper bound
from equation (14) is shown in Figure 3 (B). Although quantitatively strongly different, both
figures (A) and (B) exhibit the exponential decay that we proved for the upper bound.
The observation that the approximation error decreases for an increasing curing rate2 δ
is in line with the heuristic arguments of Van Mieghem et al. (2009) who describe a good
performance of the first order mean-field approximation for small τ . For intermediate values
of τ , however, these authors expect significantly larger first order approximation errors. In
addition, if −2δ + 4βµˆ + β ≥ 0, the upper bounds from Theorem 3 and equation (14) are not
useful anymore, since they grow exponentially in time t. These facts motivate the higher order
approximations that we consider later.
2Similar results of decreasing error are found for decreasing infection rate β and spectral radius µˆ.
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Figure 3. Exact approximation error and upper bound for different values of
the curing rate δ and fixed β = 1/2 in the regular network A (given in Figure 1)
with initial state V (0) = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)>.
Remark 3.10. From the point of view of an insurance company, cyber risk is manageable for
sufficiently small τ = βδ . The exact condition −2δ+ 4βµˆ+ β < 0 ⇔ τ < 12µˆ+1/2 depends on µˆ,
i.e., on a characteristic of the underlying network. In this situation, the infection dies out in the
long run, and the first order mean-field approximation provides an upper bound with known
bound for the approximation error. It might thus be used for pricing insurance contracts. For
small t, however, the error bound is large and in many cases not very precise, although the
approximation might be quite reasonable.
3.2.2. n-th Order.
In this section, we construct a general n-th order mean-field approximation that has the following
two benefits:
• The approximation error of the first order mean-field approximations may be quite
large for certain parameter choices. The n-th order approximation provides improved
approximations for all moments of order k ≤ n. In particular, it yields improved
estimates of single infection probabilities z
(n)
i for i = 1, . . . , N .
• On the basis of the n-th order mean-field approximation, expected insurance losses of
non-linear claims can be computed as described in Section 3.1.
3.2.2.1. Construction. Fix the order n ≤ N . By I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N} we denote a set of indices. We
define the product XI := Πi∈IXi. Since the components of X are commutative and idempotent,
we may neglect the order of the indices or powers of its components.
The dynamics of all moments are described by coupled ordinary differential equations due to
Kolmogorov’s forward equations. This system of equations is replaced by a smaller system of
equations that involves only approximations of moments up to order n:
(i) Construct an approximation for the dynamics of the n-th order moments E[Xi1 · · ·Xin ] in
terms of moments up to order n.
(ii) Use the exact relations of the dynamics of E[Xi1 · · ·Xik ] for 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 and the
approximation of the n-th order moments to estimate the lower order moments.
The details are as follows:
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Step (i): Approximative dynamics of E[XI ] for |I| = n. Kolmogorov’s forward equation
implies that
d
dt
E[Xi1Xi2 · · ·Xin ]
=E
 n∑
l=1
Xi1 · · ·Xil−1
−δXil + β(1−Xil) N∑
jl=1
ailjlXjl
Xil+1 · · ·Xin

=− nδE [Xi1 · · ·Xin ] + βE
 n∑
l=1
N∑
jl=1
ailjlXi1 · · ·Xil−1XjlXil+1 · · ·Xin

− βE
 n∑
l=1
N∑
jl=1
ailjlXi1 · · ·Xin ·Xjl
 .
Rewriting this we have the exact expression
d
dt
E[XI ] = −nδE[XI ] + β
∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1
aijE[XI\{i}∪{j}]− β
∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1
aijE[XI∪{j}]
The expression E[XI\{i}∪{j}] contains at most n factors of X: If j 6∈ I \{i}, it contains n factors,
and if j ∈ I \ {i}, it contains n − 1 factors. Thus, the first sum can be expressed in terms of
moments of order less than or equal to n.
Next, consider the term E[XI∪{j}]. If j ∈ I, then E[XI∪{j}] = E[XI ]. However, if j 6∈ I, the
expression contains n + 1 different indices. This means that the dynamics of the moments up
to order n is not described by a closed system of ordinary differential equations. To deal with
this difficulty, we extend the idea of the first order mean-field approximation and choose the
following two objects:
(i) a mean-field function F : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] and
(ii) a partition scheme (I1, I2) such that for j 6= I we have I ∪{j} = I1(I, j)∪ I2(I, j) with
I1(I, j), I2(I, j) 6= ∅. Since I is fixed for each equation, we suppress the dependence on
I in our notation.
Specific choices of these two key ingredients are addressed in the next section. When they are
chosen properly, we approximate the rate of change for the n-th order moments by
d
dt
E[XI ] ≈− nδE[XI ] + β
∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1
aijE
[
XI\{i}∪{j}
]− β∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1,j∈I
aijE[XI ]
− β
∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1,j 6∈I
aij · F
(
E[XI1(j)]
) · F (E[XI2(j)]) . (15)
This translates to the ODE
z˙
(n)
I =− nδz(n)I + β
∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1
aijz
(n)
I\{i}∪{j} − z
(n)
I β
∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1,j∈I
aij
− β
∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1,j 6∈I
aijF
(
z
(n)
I1(j)
)
· F
(
z
(n)
I2(j)
)
describing the approximative dynamics of the n-th order moments.
Step (ii): Exact dynamics of E[XI ] for |I| < n. For moments of order less than n, we write
according to Kolmogorov’s forward equation
d
dt
E[XI ] = −nδE[XI ] + β
∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1
aijE
[
XI\{i}∪{j}
]− β∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1
aijE
[
XI∪{j}
]
,
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and observe that all moments in this exact equation are of order less than or equal to n.
Plugging in the approximations of order n, we obtain the ODE system of the n-th order
mean-field approximation:
|I| = n : z˙(n)I =−
nδ + β∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1,j∈I
aij
 z(n)I + β∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1
aijz
(n)
I\{i}∪{j}
− β
∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1,j 6∈I
aijF
(
z
(n)
I1(j)
)
· F
(
z
(n)
I2(j)
)
|I| < n : z˙(n)I =− nδz(n)I + β
∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1
aijz
(n)
I\{i}∪{j} − β
∑
i∈I
N∑
j=1
aijz
(n)
I∪{j},

. (16)
The initial condition is the initial configuration of the Markovian system.
Definition 3.11. For a mean-field function F and a partition scheme, we define the n-th order
mean-field approximation as a solution to the ODE system (16), i.e.,(
z
(n)
I
)
I⊆{1,2,...,N}, |I|≤n
Remark 3.12. The structure of the ODEs in the n-th order case is analogous to the first order
case. The matrix form of the ODE system (16) as well as the generalization of the existence
and uniqueness results of Theorem 3.6 to the n-th order case is discussed in Appendix C.
3.2.2.2. Approximation Types and Optimal Split. In this section, we introduce two specific types
of higher order mean-field approximations and address the problem of optimally splitting the
set I ∪ {j} for |I| = n and j /∈ I consisting of n + 1 different indices into the two non-empty,
disjoint subsets I1(j) and I2(j). In contrast to the first order case, this requires a specific choice
that may influence the quality of the resulting mean-field approximation. As before, we consider
the two mean-field functions F1(x) = x and F2(x) =
√
x.
(i) The choice of the mean-field function F1(x) = x leads to the n-th order independent
approximation. The approximation works as follows: For j 6∈ I
E[XI∪{j}] = E[XI1(j)] · E[XI2(j)] + Cov(XI1(j), XI2(j)) ≈ E[XI1(j)] · E[XI2(j)].
No error corresponds to a split ofXI∪{j} intoXI1(j) andXI2(j) such that Cov(XI1(j), XI2(j))
is zero. The factors should thus be as uncorrelated as possible.
(ii) Choosing F2(x) =
√
x leads to the n-th order Hilbert approximation.
In this case, we set
E[XI∪{j}] =
√
E[XI1(j)] ·
√
E[XI2(j)] · cosφ ≈
√
E[XI1(j)] ·
√
E[XI2(j)],
for j 6∈ I. The angle φ is defined via the scalar product 〈R,S〉 := E[RS] for R,S ∈ L2
in the usual Hilbert space. The split is good whenever the angle φ between XI1(j) and
XI2(j) is close to 0
◦. This corresponds to highly dependent factors.
A naive single split partitions the set I ∪ {j} into the subsets I1(j) = I and I2(j) = {j}.
Note that the sets are enumerated and, thus, the naive single split is uniquely determined. This
approach may not always be ideal, if small or strong dependence of the factors is desired in
order to keep the error of the approximation small. We suggest a first alternative that is based
on a measurement of the nodes’ distances in the graph.
The graph structure is described by the adjacency matrix A ∈ RN×N , i.e., there exists a link
between i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, if aij = aji = 1. If two agents are not directly connected, they
might be connected indirectly. We define piij as the length of the shortest path in the graph
that connects two agents i 6= j, i.e.,
piij := min{l ∈ N : aik1 = ak1k2 = ak2k3 = · · · = akl−1j = 1}.
We set Π = (piij)i,j=1,2,...,N with piii = 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N . The splitting algorithm is
described by the following pseudocode.
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Algorithm 3.13.
INPUT: An index set I with |I| = n and j /∈ I is given.
OUTPUT: The output is a partition I1(j), I2(j) of I ∪ {j} constructed as follows:
Step 1: Consider a set of partitions J1(j), J2(j) of I ∪ {j}.
Step 2: Choose some α ∈ (0, 1) and calculate for each partition the following
distance measure:
mα(J1(j), J2(j)) :=
∑
i∈J1(j)
∑
i′∈J2(j)
αpiii′ . (17)
Step 3: We consider four alternative choices.
a) Minimal single split:
We choose the partition I1(j), I2(j) with |I2(j)| = 1 that minimizes mα.
b) Maximal single split:
We choose the partition I1(j), I2(j) with |I2(j)| = 1 that maximizes mα.
c) Minimal equal split:
We choose the partition I1(j), I2(j) with |I1(j)| = |I2(j)|, if n+ 1 is even, or
|I1(j)| = |I2(j)|+ 1, if n+ 1 is odd, that minimizes mα.
d) Maximal equal split:
We choose the partition I1(j), I2(j) with |I1(j)| = |I2(j)|, if n+ 1 is even, or
|I1(j)| = |I2(j)|+ 1, if n+ 1 is odd, that maximizes mα.
Observe that large values of our distance measure mα correspond to small graph distances.
In line with our heuristic arguments above, we thus apply choices a) and c) to the independent
approximation and choices b) and d) to the Hilbert approximation.
Example 3.14. To illustrate higher order mean-field approximations, we consider two different
networks: the network with adjacency matrix A defined in Figure 1 with fixed infection rate
β = 1/2 and curing rate δ = 2.01, and the network with adjacency matrix B defined in Figure
4 with β = δ = 1/2. For both networks, nodes 1, 3 and 7 are initially infected. Figure
B :=

0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 0
 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Figure 4. A network with N = 7 nodes and spectral radius µˆ ≈ 2.3429.
5 displays the evolution of the aggregate infection probability of initially healthy nodes, i.e.,∑
j∈{2,4,5,6} z
(n)
j , for the original Markov chain together with mean-field approximations of order
n = 2, 3, 4 in both networks under the different splitting choices. We observe that the higher
the order of the mean-field approximation, the better is the approximation. In examples (A),
(B) and (C), a fourth order mean-field approximation already provides a reasonably good fit
to the exact infection probabilities. However, increasing the order of the approximation also
substantially increases its computational cost. In comparison to the naive single split, the
optimized single split of Algorithm 3.13 leads to moderate improvements in all four cases. A
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Figure 5. Aggregate infection probability of initially healthy nodes. Solid lines
represent naive single split approximations; dashed lines correspond to the results
of Algorithm 3.13 (α = 0.5) under a single split; dotted lines represent the results
of Algorithm 3.13 (α = 0.5) under an equal split.
split into subsets of equal size, however, impairs the approximation quality3 in the cases (A), (B)
and (D). In contrast to that, in part (C), the fourth order equal split performs slightly better
than the optimized single split. A possible reason for this is the special distance structure for
subsets of size three in the network B. This indicates that the structure of the network topology
is key to finding an optimal splitting algorithm. Future research should investigate this issue
further, analyze how Algorithm 3.13 might be improved, e.g., by choosing a better distance
measure instead of mα, and how computational cost and precision can be optimally balanced.
4. Case Studies
4.1. Model Setting. In this section, we compute the expected insurance losses for different
insurance contracts in numerical case studies. We consider three network topologies, illustrated
in Figure 6. All networks consist of N = 50 agents or nodes which are all connected to D = 7
other nodes. This means that the degree of each node is 7. The number of edges in each of
the networks equals ND/2 = 175, and the spectral radius of the three corresponding adjacency
matrices is µˆ = D = 7.
3Obviously, single and equal split coincide for the second order approximations, since here sets of cardinality
three are split.
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(a) Homogeneous (b) Clustered (c) Star-shaped
Figure 6. Stylized regular network scenarios. Quantities that are kept constant
are the number of nodes N = 50 and the degree of each node D = 7. In
particular, this yields a constant total number of edges ND/2 = 175 and a
constant spectral radius µˆ = D = 7.
A. Homogeneous network: The first network that we consider consists of agents of the
same type that are homogeneously connected to each other. The corresponding adjacency
matrix of this and the other two considered networks can be found in Appendix D. In the
homogeneous cyber networks, there is no hierarchy of nodes in terms of data flow and related
cyber threats.
B. Clustered network: The key feature of the clustered network is that agents form groups
that are closely connected. In contrast, agents within a cluster are less connected to agents
from other clusters. This structure might be a more realistic model of cyber networks than a
homogeneous network: Consider, e.g., different firms or divisions that are internally densely
connected, but less densely connected with other firms or divisions. Qualitatively, the model
captures different levels of security for internal and external connections.
C. Star-shaped network: Unlike the clustered network, the star-shaped cyber network pos-
sesses a clear hierarchy between central nodes that provide a hub for the data flow, and a
number of periphery clusters that are internally homogeneously connected, but apart from
the connections via the hub isolated from agents in other clusters.
The cyber networks are the channel for the spread of the cyber infection that makes agents
vulnerable to cyber attacks. Cyber attacks affect all vulnerable agents at times that are modeled
by a point process. The incurred losses are random. We will provide the parameters of the
numerical case studies below.
In this setting, we computed the expected losses for three types of contracts: proportional
insurance, excess of loss per risk insurance (XL), and catastrophe excess of loss insurance (Cat-
XL). The functions that map physical losses to insured losses were described in equation (3)
and Example 3.2. Exact expected contract losses can be computed according to (2). We will
apply the mean-field approximation to estimate this quantity.
In our numerical case studies we use the following parameters. The parameters of the infection
dynamics (1) are β = 0.5 and δ = β ·µˆ+0.01 = 3.51. Initially, 10 nodes, i.e., 20% of all nodes, are
infected. The location of the initially infected nodes is shown in Figure 7. These were sampled
from an initial infection that is uniformly distributed across the network. Cyber attacks that
cause losses at infected, i.e., vulnerable nodes occur at the jumps of a homogeneous Poisson
process with rate λ = 3. A cyber event causes a loss at each vulnerable node that is exponentially
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(a) Homogeneous (b) Clustered (c) Star
Figure 7. Infection scenario: The red nodes (3,5,13,15,23,25,33,35,43,45) are
initially infected.
distributed with mean µ = 2, i.e., with parameter 1/2. For the insurance contracts, we choose
a policy period T = 3.
For the numerical simulation we exploit the mean-field approximation to analyze the spread
process. In order to generate the losses due to cyber attacks, we use a simple Monte-Carlo
approach. We simulate 100.000 sample paths of the homogeneous Poisson process and corre-
sponding random losses in the time interval [0, T ]. For each simulation we compute the integrand
of equation (5). Averaging over these results yields our Monte-Carlo estimator of the expected
aggregate losses of the reinsurance company; its standard error will be stated in brackets.
4.2. Model Results. We comment on the results of the simulation.
4.2.1. Infection Probabilities and Mean-Field-Approximations. We first analyze the
spread process of the cyber infection for the three different network structures. At this stage,
we do not consider any cyber losses. We consider the independent approximation with naive
single split. The aggregate infection probability of initially healthy nodes is a measure of the
strength of the infection, i.e.,
AP h(n)(t) :=
∑
i∈H
z
(n)
i (t),
where H denotes the set of initially healthy nodes and n is the order of the mean-field approx-
imation.
Figure 8 displays the approximation results for n = 1, 2, 3, 4: First, for all networks, the
fourth order mean-field approximation and the third order approximation are reasonably close
to each other. This indicates that a mean-field approximation of order four provides a relatively
good proxy for the exact probability of infection. Second, we find that the infection probability
in the homogeneous network tends to be the highest (for t > 0.5) while the star exhibits the
lowest infection probability. This result will be of key importance for the expected losses of a
reinsurance company.
4.2.2. Expected Aggregate Losses of the Insurance Company. We now study cyber
losses.
4.2.2.1. Proportional Reinsurance. For simplicity, we consider full insurance; other percentages
lead to similar results. The results are shown in Table 1. These indicate that the homogeneous
network constitutes the highest risk, while the star network exhibits the lowest average losses.
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Figure 8. Mean-field approximations of order n = 1, 2, 3, 4 for the aggregate
infection probability of initially healthy nodes in the homogeneous (A), clus-
tered (B) and star network (C). Part (D) compares the fourth order mean-field
approximations for the different network structures.
Table 1. Proportional insurance
Losses: Total coverage Homogeneous Clustered Star
First order MFA 96.4671 (0.1039) 97.6170 (0.1105) 96.5425 (0.1095)
Second order MFA 51.4911 (0.0836) 39.7776 (0.0797) 39.4127 (0.0782)
Third order MFA 77.8349 (0.0943) 70.6588 (0.0901) 68.0767 (0.0883)
Fourth order MFA 68.0676 (0.0890) 61.3693 (0.0855) 59.9005 (0.0843)
4.2.2.2. XL. In this case, we assume that the limit per loss is equal to 2. We consider only the
lowest tier with priority 0. Using the notation introduced in Example 3.2, the random insurance
losses are
∑N
i=1 Lˆi(t)Xi(t) with Lˆi(t) = Li(t)
+ − (Li(t)− 2)+ = min{Li(t), 2}. Apart from the
modified losses Lˆi instead of Li we are again in the situation of a proportional contract. As
expected, the numerical results in Table 2 show that the homogeneous network produces the
highest expected losses, while the losses are lowest in the star network.
4.2.2.3. Cat-XL. Finally, we consider an excess of loss per event contract. We consider coverage
of the lowest tier, i.e., a priority 0, and choose a cover of 60. Of course, the numerical results in
Table 3 exhibit again the same ordering of the networks in terms of risk. But, more importantly,
the numerical analysis shows very clearly that the first order mean-field approximation is not
able to capture this type of contract. Due to its non-linearity, this is not surprising, but the
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Table 2. Excess of loss per risk (XL)
Losses: XL Homogeneous Clustered Star
First order MFA 60.9795 (0.0684) 61.7036 (0.0692) 61.0247 (0.0686)
Second order MFA 32.5475 (0.0522) 25.1401 (0.0497) 24.9105 (0.0488)
Third order MFA 49.2010 (0.0589) 44.6618 (0.0563) 43.0300 (0.0552)
Fourth order MFA 43.0265 (0.0556) 38.7894 (0.0534) 37.8615 (0.0526)
extreme size of the error could not be expected a priori. This demonstrates that higher order
mean-field approximations are necessary for the computation of the expected insurance losses
and are thus also needed for pricing contracts within our model setting.
To be more specific, the contract function of the Cat-XL is given by
fCat-XL(L(t) ◦X(t)) = gCat-XL(ΛΣ(L(t) ◦X(t))),
where ΛΣ(x1, . . . , xN ) :=
∑N
i=1 xi, and g
Cat-XL(y) := (y)+ − (y − 60)+ = min(y, 60). We follow
Algorithm 3.4 and approximate the non-linear claim function gCat-XL on a compact interval by
a polynomial of chosen degree d.
• Compact approximation interval. We choose  = 0.05 and determine a constant u ∈ R+
such that
P (ΛΣ(L) > u) ≤ . (18)
We use the compact interval [0, u] for the polynomial approximation. Setting St :=
ΛΣ(L(t)) =
∑N
i=1 Li(t), we define ut := F
−1
St
(1 − ). Since St is independent of t and
Gamma-distributed with parameters N = 50 and µ = 2, we obtain u = ut ≈ 124.3412.
• Polynomial approximation. For degrees d ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} we determine the best uni-
form approximation of gCat-XL on [0, u]. Figure 9 depicts the resulting polynomial
approximations for d ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The error ed(gCat-XL) = ‖gCat-XL − pd‖∞,[0,u] of
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Figure 9. Best uniform polynomial approximations of gCat-XL for different poly-
nomial degrees in the compact interval [0, 124.3412].
the approximations on the interval is d1(g
Cat-XL) = 15.5189, d2(g
Cat-XL) = 4.0187,
d3(g
Cat-XL) = 3.8741 and d4(g
Cat-XL) = 2.1740.
According to Section 3.1, the total L1-error is bounded from above by Ed := ed(g
Cat-XL) + 60 · 
which yields E1 ≈ 18.5189, E2 ≈ 7.0187, E3 ≈ 6.8741 and E4 ≈ 5.1740. We combine the
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polynomial approximations of gCat-XL with the fourth order independent mean-field approx-
imation with single split. The fourth order approximation is more accurate for lower order
moments, but the linear polynomial approximation is of such a low quality that the resulting
error is very large. In particular, a first order mean-field approximation is not able to deliver
appropriate results for the Cat-XL. The expected losses are given in Table 3. We reduced the
number of Monte-Carlo samples to 10.000 for d = 1, 2, 3 and to 1000 for d = 4 due to the higher
computational complexity4.
The fact that the first order approximation performs very badly can be seen by comparing
the result to full insurance in Table 1. Clearly, full insurance should provide an upper bound on
the Cat-XL. The polynomial approximation of degree 1 of the Cat-XL is, however, far larger.
Table 3. Excess of loss per event (Cat-XL)
Losses: Cat-XL Homogeneous Clustered Star
d = 1 169.6693 (0.5733) 166.6429 (0.5638) 165.9828 (0.5616)
d = 2 64.5432 (0.3047) 56.5714 (0.2942) 54.9458 (0.2906)
d = 3 52.4555 (0.2867) 44.0598 (0.2796) 42.3615 (0.2764)
d = 4 59.2664 (0.8249) 52.8354 (0.7905) 51.0151 (0.7765)
Let us finally mention that we considered insurance of all agents in the network and an initial
distribution of the infection that was uniformly sampled across the network. This implied a
clear ranking of the three network structures in terms of the risk. The spread of the infection
will be different, if specific nodes – e.g., the core nodes of the star network – are the origin of the
infection. Our model is capable of identifying critical nodes from which the infection spreads.
The effect can explicitly be quantified. Another interesting analysis concerns the elimination of
links and its impact on aggregate losses. Thereby connections can be identified (and potentially
modified) that are critical for the spread of the infection.
Remark 4.1. There are different potential sources of error in our model. First, as discussed in
Section 3, our suggested polynomial and mean-field approximation methods obviously induce
an error through the approximation of non-linear claim functions and the closure of moment
equations, respectively. In addition to that, there are sources of error inherent in the explicit
calculations. These include, in particular, the use of an appropriate ODE solver as well as the
Monte-Carlo simulation of the processes M and L. Quantitative predictions using our model
must thus account for all these factors at the same time.
5. Conclusion
We developed a model of cyber losses that are triggered by two underlying risk processes.
First, a cyber infection spreads in a network, modeled by an interacting Markov process. Second,
infected, i.e., vulnerable agents incur losses due to cyber attacks that occur according to a point
process. Due to the large dimension of the system, the computation of expected aggregate
insurance losses and pricing of cyber contracts is extremely challenging. We constructed a
polynomial approximation for claim functions and higher order mean-field approximations that
make these problems tractable. We demonstrated that for non-linear claim functions, higher
order polynomial approximations and mean-field approximations are indispensable. We also
showed that, if the initial infection is uniformly distributed and all agents in the network are
insured, homogeneous networks are the most risky and star networks the least. Our techniques
can also be applied to identify critical initial infections and critical links in networks that
augment expected losses. A key role is played by the network topology.
4For one single simulated path of the homogeneous Poisson process and corresponding random losses, the compu-
tation time cd (in seconds) of expected aggregate losses increases exponentially in the chosen polynomial degree
d: c1 ≈ 0.1930, c2 ≈ 0.2488, c3 ≈ 5.0934 and c4 ≈ 97.9040. This is due to increasing dimensions of matrix
operations such as, for example, evaluating the mean-field approximated joint moments at the simulated jump
times.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 3.6. We define the two functions
G1(x) := (βA− δI)x− βdiag(x)Ax, and
G2(x) := (βA− δI)x− βdiag(
√
x)A
√
x,
for x ∈ RN .
(i) Existence. For G1, the Picard-Lindelo¨f theorem (Theorem B.1) used in the proof of (ii)
also yields existence of a solution to (11).
For G2, i.e., for the ODE describing the first order Hilbert approximation, we use
Theorem B.2 to prove existence of a solution. Define a nonlinear map G¯2 : RN → RN
by G¯2 = (βA− δI)x− β diag
√|x|A√|x| where the absolute value and square root are
taken componentwise. Now consider the ODE system X˙(t) = G¯2(X(t)). This enlarges
the domain of definition of G¯2 compared to the original function in (13), G2, but does
not do any harm for initial conditions in RN≥0.
We now estimate the norm of G¯2. The matrix A = (aij)1≤i,j≤N has zeros on the
main diagonal so we find
diag
√
|x|A
√
|x| =
∑
j 6=1
a1j
√
|x1xj |, . . . ,
∑
j 6=N
aNj
√
|xNxj |
> .
With |xi| ≤ ||x||∞ and noting that aij ∈ {0, 1} we have∑
j 6=i
aij
√
|xixj | ≤
∑
j 6=i
||x||∞ = (N − 1)||x||∞.
Moreover, ||Ax||∞ ≤ ||A|| · ||x||∞ for the operator norm of A with respect to the l∞-
norm. Thus overall,
||G¯2(x)||∞ ≤ (β||A||+ δ +N − 1)||x||∞.
Now let x0 ∈ RN and choose r > 0. The previous inequality translates to
||G¯2(x)||∞ ≤ C(||x0||∞ + r).
on Br(x0) = {x ∈ RN : ||x− x0|| < r} with C = β||A||+ δ +N − 1. Then consider the
reciprocal fraction M/r with M = supx∈Br(x0) ||G¯2(x)||:
M
r
≤ C(||x0||∞ + r)
r
.
Thus
r
M
≥ 1
C
r
||x0||∞ + r .
Theorem B.2 now shows that existence of a solution to (13) holds for any T satisfying
the inequality T < r/M .
The global existence of a solution now follows from an iteration argument where
in the j-th step we have initial condition x
(j)
0 and radius r
(j). Start with any given
initial condition x
(1)
0 = W (0) and set r
(1) = ||x(1)0 ||∞. Then by Theorem B.2 there
is a solution to (13), W , on the time interval (0, 12C ]. Repeat this process with the
new initial condition x
(2)
0 = W (
1
2C ) and with r
(2) = ||x(2)0 ||∞. This will again have a
solution on an interval of length at least 12C . Iterating this process and concatenating
the solutions yields a solution on [0, T ] for arbitrary T .
(ii) Uniqueness. Let BR(0) be the open ball of radius R in RN endowed with the Euclidean
norm. We prove uniqueness using the Picard-Lindelo¨f theorem (Theorem B.1). Thus,
we need to show that there exists a Lipschitz constant L > 0 such that
||G1(x1)−G1(x2)||2 ≤ L||x1 − x2||2 (19)
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for all x1, x2 ∈ BR(0). Then, Theorem B.1 states that the ODE has a unique solution
on some small time interval [0, t0]. Since the Lipschitz constant L does not depend
on time, the solution exists on the time interval [0,∞). The solution is smooth by
Proposition 6.2 of Taylor (2011) so in particular belongs to C([0,∞),RN ).
To prove the Lipschitz condition (19), first recall that the operator norm ||A||op of a
matrix A acting RN → RN endowed with the Euclidean norm is given by the spectral
radius µˆ of A. Thus, it follows that the operator norm of diag(x) is bounded by ||x||2.
The claim now follows from a direct calculation. Let x1, x2 ∈ BR(0). Then
||G1(x1)−G1(x2)||2
=||(βA− δI)x1 − β diag(x1)Ax1 − (βA− δI)x2 + β diag(x2)Ax2||2
=||(δI− βA)(x1 − x2) + β (diag(x1 − x2)Ax1 + β diag(x2)A(x1 − x2)) ||2
≤δ||x1 − x2||2 + β||A||op||x1 − x2||2 + β||diag(x1 − x2)||op||A||op||x1||2
+ β||diag(x2)||op||A||op||x1 − x2||2
=(δ + βµˆ(1 + 2R)||x1 − x2||2,
where we used the facts that ||diag(x1 − x2)||op ≤ ||x1 − x2||2 and ||xi||2 < R for i =
1, 2.
(iii) Sandwich Property.
(a) First, we prove W (t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0. By definition, all components of W (0)
are nonnegative. Now, by inspection of (13), we can immediately deduce that
whenever a component, say wi, at some time t
′ is zero, then its derivative w˙i(t′)
is nonnegative. Thus, the trajectory of wi(t) will be nonnegative for some time by
the fundamental theorem of calculus. By the continuity of the solution, it follows
that W (t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0.
(b) Second, we prove the lower inequality for the exact dynamics, i.e., W (t) ≤ E[X(t)]
for all t ≥ 0. The proof of the upper inequality E[X(t)] ≤ V (t) is analogous. To
begin with, we know that W (0) = E[X(0)] = V (0) ∈ [0, 1]N by definition and that
dW (t)/dt ≤ dE[X(t)]/dt (see equation (12)). Let H(t) := E[X(t)] −W (t), i.e.,
hi(t) = E[Xi(t)]− wi(t) for all i = 1, . . . , N . Then, dH(t)/dt ≥ 0 for t ≥ 0 and
H(0) = 0. Now consider the interval [0, t] ⊂ R for t > 0. From the mean-value
theorem for vector-valued functions (cf. Matkowski (2012)), it follows that there
exist constants m1, . . . ,mN ∈ [0, t] such that:
H(t)−H(0) = (t− 0) · (dh1
dt
(m1), . . . ,
dhN
dt
(mN ))
> ≥ 0.
Thus, we have that H(t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0, which proves W (t) ≤ E[X(t)] for all
t ≥ 0.
(c) Third, we show that V (t) ≤ 1 for all t ≥ 0. By definition, all components of V (0)
are not larger than 1. Now, by inspection of (11), we can immediately deduce
that whenever a component at some time t′ is 1, e.g., vi(t′) = 1, the reaction
term vanishes so that v˙i(t
′) = −δ < 0. Thus, the function is pushed away from 1
towards 0. By the continuity of the solution, it follows that V (t) ≤ 1 for all t ≥ 0.
(iv) Stability. We apply Theorem B.3 to the function G1. First, V
∗ ≡ 0 is an obvious
fix-point of G1. Second, the Jacobi matrix of G1 at any point V ∈ RN is given by
JG1(V ) = βA− δI− β (diag(V )A+ diag(AV )) .
In particular, at the fix-point V ∗ ≡ 0, the Jacobi matrix reduces to
JG1(0) = βA− δI = −δ(I− τA),
with τ = β/δ. JG1(0) is real and symmetric and, thus, possesses only real eigenvalues.
Let λ1, . . . , λN denote the eigenvalues of A. Then, the eigenvalues of JG1(0) are given
by −δ(1 − τλi) for i = 1, . . . , N . Hence, all eigenvalues of JG1(0) are negative if and
only if τ < 1/max1≤i≤N λi = 1/µˆ =: τ
(1)
c . Thus, in this case, it follows from Theorem
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B.3 that the fix-point V ∗ ≡ 0 is exponentially stable. Finally, since W (t) ≤ V (t) (part
(iii)), it follows that the zero solution is also exponentially stable for (13).
A.2. Proof of Theorem 3.8. The difference yi(t) = E[Xi(t)]− vi(t) satisfies the ODE
d
dt
yi(t) =− δyi(t) + β(1− yi(t))
N∑
k=1
akiyk(t)
− βRi(t)− βyi(t)
N∑
k=1
akivk(t)− βvi(t)
N∑
k=1
akiyk(t)
with initial condition yi(0) = 0. We want to apply Gronwall’s inequality to the `
2-norm
1
2 ||y(t)||22. As a first step we note that
d
dt
1
2yi(t)
2 =yi(t) · d
dt
yi(t)
=− δyi(t)2 + βyi(t)(1− yi(t))
N∑
k=1
akiyk(t)
− βyi(t)Ri(t)− βyi(t)2
N∑
k=1
akivk(t)− βyi(t)vi(t)
N∑
k=1
akiyk(t).
Summing over all i we obtain
d
dt
1
2 ||y(t)||2 =− δ||y(t)||2 + β
N∑
i=1
yi(t)(1− yi(t))
N∑
k=1
akiyk(t)
− β〈y(t), R(t)〉 − β
N∑
i=1
yi(t)
2
N∑
k=1
akivk(t)− β
N∑
i=1
yi(t)vi(t)
N∑
k=1
akiyk(t)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the standard inner product on RN .
We now estimate the terms on the right hand side. Recall that E[Xi(t)] and vi(t) only take val-
ues in the interval [0, 1] so that also |yi(t)| ≤ 1. Denote by |y(t)| the vector (|y1(t)|, . . . , |yN (t)|).
• We find that∣∣∣∣∣β
N∑
i=1
yi(t)(1− yi(t))
N∑
k=1
akiyk(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ β
N∑
i=1
|yi(t)|
N∑
k=1
aki|yk(t)|
≤ β〈|y(t)|, A|y(t)|〉
≤ β||A||op||y(t)||2
• Clearly, −β∑Ni=1 yi(t)2∑Nk=1 akivk(t) ≤ 0.
• It holds that: −β〈y(t), R(t)〉 ≤ |β〈y(t), R(t)〉| ≤ β||y(t)||||R(t)|| ≤ β2 ||y(t)||2 + β2 ||R(t)||2• As for the first term, we find∣∣∣∣∣β
N∑
i=1
yi(t)vi(t)
N∑
k=1
akiyk(t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ β
N∑
i=1
|yi(t)|
N∑
k=1
aki|yk(t)|
≤ β〈|y(t)|, A|y(t)|〉
≤ β||A||op||y(t)||2
As before, ||A||op denotes the operator norm of the matrix A; it is given by the largest eigenvalue
µˆ of A.
Collecting these estimates we arrive at
d
dt
1
2 ||y(t)||2 ≤
(
−δ + 2β||A||op + β2
)
||y(t)||2 + β2 ||R(t)||2
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or
d
dt
||y(t)||2 ≤ (−2δ + 4β||A||op + β) ||y(t)||2 + β||R(t)||2
We now apply Gronwall’s inequality in its differential form for which the sign of the term in
brackets is immaterial. This yields
||y(t)||2 ≤ e(−2δ+4β||A||op+β)tβ
∫ t
0
||R(s)||2ds,
as claimed.
Appendix B. Basic ODE Theory
For convenience of the reader, this section contains the basic results from ODE theory used
in the proofs of Appendix A. To begin with, we need the following two main results on existence
and uniqueness (cf. Taylor (2011, Theorem 2.1) and Hille (1968, Theorem 2.4.1)).
Theorem B.1 (Picard-Lindelo¨f-Uniqueness). Consider the general ODE system
dy
dt
= F (t, y), y(t0) = y0 (20)
with F : Dom(F ) ⊂ RN+1 → RN defined in a neighborhood of (t0, y0). Let y0 ∈ O be an open
subset of Rn and I ⊂ R an interval containing t0. Suppose F is continuous on I × O and
satisfies the Lipschitz condition:
‖F (t, y1)− F (t, y2)‖ ≤ L‖y1 − y2‖,
for t ∈ I, yj ∈ O. Then equation (20) has a unique solution on some t-interval containing t0.
Theorem B.2 (Peano-Existence). Suppose F (y) is defined and continuous in Br(y0) where
Br(y0) = {y ∈ Rn : ||y − y0|| < r} and suppose that ||F (y)|| ≤ M on Br(y0). Then the
autonomous differential equation dydt = F (y) with initial condition y0 has at least one solution y
defined on the time interval (−T, T ) where T < r/M .
In addition to the key questions of existence and uniqueness, one is also interested in equilib-
ria, i.e., fix-points y∗ with F (t, y∗) = 0, and their stability, i.e., the behavior of solutions near
them. For the autonomous differential system
dy
dt
= F (y), y(0) = y0,
a fix-point y∗ is called exponentially stable, if there exist constants α, , C > 0 such that for all
t ≥ 0
|y(t)− y∗| ≤ Ce−αt|y(0)−y∗|,
for any |y(0) − y∗| ≤  (Teschl (2012, Chapter 6.5)). Exponential stability is the strongest
type of equilibrium stability and can be proven using the following basic result (Teschl (2012,
Theorem 6.10)):
Theorem B.3. (Exponential stability via linearization) Suppose F ∈ C1 has a fix-point y∗ and
suppose that all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at y∗ have negative real part. Then y∗ is
exponentially stable.
Appendix C. Matrix Form of the n-th Order Mean-Field Approximation
Let M :=
∑n
k=1
(
N
k
)
and denote the n-th order mean-field approximation by
z(n) := (z
(n)
1 , z
(n)
2 , . . . , z
(n)
N , z
(n)
12 , . . . , z
(n)
1N , . . . , z
(n)
1···n, . . . )
> ∈ RM ,
i.e., by the vector of solutions to the ODE system (16) in lexicographical order. Written in
matrix form, (16) reads
z˙(n) = (βA(n) − nδI)z(n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Linear term
−β Q(z(n);F,Split)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quadratic term
, (21)
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with identity matrix I ∈ RM×M . As in the first order case, the matrix equation is given as the
difference of a linear and a quadratic term. Note that the linear term is independent of the
mean-field function F and the chosen split, whereas the quadratic term crucially relies on these
parameters. We now describe both terms in detail.
Linear term. The matrix A(n) ∈ RM×M is a tridiagonal block matrix:
A(n) :=

D1,1 U1,2 0
L2,1 D2,2 U2,3
L3,2 D3,3 U3,4
. . .
. . .
. . .
Ln−1,n−2 Dn−1,n−1 Un−1,n
0 Ln,n−1 Dn,n

with diagonal blocks
Dk,k ∈ R(Nk )×(Nk ) with entries:
Dk,kI,I = A
(n)
I,I = −
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈I
aij ,
Dk,kI,I\{i}∪{j}(i∈I,j 6∈I) = A
(n)
I,I\{i}∪{j}(i∈I,j 6∈I) = aij ,
for |I| = k, and k = 1, . . . , n,
upper diagonal blocks
Uk,k+1 ∈ R(Nk )×( Nk+1) with entries:
Uk,k+1I,I∪{j}(j 6∈I) = A
(n)
I,I∪{j}(j 6∈I) = −
∑
i∈I
aij ,
for |I| = k, k = 1, . . . , n− 1,
and lower diagonal blocks
Lk,k−1 ∈ R(Nk )×( Nk−1) with entries:
Lk,k−1I,I\{i}(i∈I) = A
(n)
I,I\{i}(i∈I) =
∑
j∈I
aij ,
for |I| = k, k = 2, . . . , n.
Quadratic term. The quadratic term Q(z(n);F,Split) depends on the mean-field function F and
on the chosen split I ∪ {j} = I1(j)∪ I2(j) (for all subsets I ⊆ {1, . . . , N} of size |I| = n and all
indices j ∈ {1, . . . , N} with j 6∈ I). We denote the split in matrix form by N pairs of matrices
(I1(1), I2(1)) , . . . , (I1(N), I2(N)) ,
where I`(j) ∈ {0, 1}M×M (` = 1, 2) is defined by its entries
(I`(j))I,J :=
{
1, if |I| = n, j 6∈ I, J = I`(j),
0, otherwise,
i.e., the row of the matrices I1(j) and I2(j) that corresponds to the set I encodes the subset
split of I ∪{j}, i.e., I1(j) and I2(j), respectively. Using this notation for the split, we can write
the quadratic term in matrix form as
Q(z(n);F, (I1(j), I2(j))j=1,...,N ) =
N∑
j=1
diag
(
I1(j) · F (z(n))
)
· C(n)(j) · I2(j) · F (z(n)),
where,
F (z(n)) := (F (z
(n)
1 ), F (z
(n)
2 ), . . . , F (z
(n)
N ), F (z
(n)
12 ), . . . , F (z
(n)
1N ), . . . , F (z
(n)
1···n), . . . )
> ∈ RM ,
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and for j = 1, . . . , N , the diagonal matrix C(n)(j) ∈ RM×M is defined by its entries
(C(n)(j))I,I :=
{∑
i∈I aij , if |I| = n, j /∈ I
0, otherwise.
Remark C.1. Plugging the derived expression for Q(z(n);F,Split) into equation (21), we im-
mediately see that the matrix equations for the n-th and first order mean-field approximations
(cf. equations (11) and (13)) possess an analogous structure. Hence, the existence of a solu-
tion to the n-th order mean-field approximation (for the mean-field functions F (x) = x and
F (x) =
√
x) as well as its uniqueness (for F (x) = x) follow analogously to the proof of Theorem
3.6 (i) and (ii), respectively.
Example C.2. As a concrete example, we consider the quadratic term for the single split.
Recall that this split is defined by I1(j) = I and I2(j) = j for all possible subsets I of size n
and indices j /∈ I. In this case, the matrices Isingle1 (j) become diagonal matrices, i.e.,
(Isingle1 (j))I,I =
{
1, if |I| = n, j /∈ I,
0, otherwise,
and the matrices Isingle2 (j) have non-zero entries only in the lower left corner, i.e.,
(Isingle2 (j))I,j =
{
1, if |I| = n, j /∈ I,
0, otherwise.
This leads to the following quadratic term:
Q(z(n);F,Single Split) =
N∑
j=1
diag
(
Isingle1 (j) · F (z(n))
)
· C(n)(j) · Isingle2 (j) · F (z(n))
=
N∑
j=1
diag
(
F (z(n))
)
· Isingle1 (j) · C(n)(j) · Isingle2 (j) · F (z(n))
= diag
(
F (z(n))
)
·
 N∑
j=1
Isingle1 (j) · C(n)(j) · Isingle2 (j)
 · F (z(n))
= diag
(
F (z(n))
)
·B(n) · F (z(n)),
where the first step follows since Isingle1 (j) is diagonal and the matrix B(n) ∈ RM×M is defined
by its entries in the lower left corner
(B(n))I,j =
{∑
i∈I aij , if |I| = n, j /∈ I
0, otherwise.
Note that in this special case, the quadratic term possesses the exact same structure as in the
first order case.
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Appendix D. Adjacency Matrices
We explicitly give the adjacency matrices for the three example networks depicted in Figure
6. The corresponding MATLAB-files are available upon request.
A
Homogeneous
=

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0

A
Clustered
=

0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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